Until 2009, virtually all publishers in the U.S. sold their books (both print and eBooks) to resellers under the wholesale model. Typically, books would be sold by publishers to resellers at 50% of their suggested list prices--the prices printed on the book covers. Resellers were then free to resell the books at any price they desired. This was the model (along with co-op payments for display locations at the front of bookstores and preferred positions on bookshelves) that Barnes & Noble and Borders used to drive hundreds, if not thousands, of independent booksellers out of business with discounting. In many cases, the "big box" booksellers sold books for less than the price that independent booksellers paid to buy them.
Amazon used the same model to launch its entry into the eBooks business. Amazon's strategy was to sell all its eBooks for $9.99 or less, even if that meant selling them below the wholesale price. Amazon quickly controlled as much as 90% of the U.S. eBook market.
In 2009, as part of its entry into the eBook business, Apple proposed a different model to the Big 6 publishers (all of the companies under investigation plus Random House), which became known as agency pricing. Under agency pricing, booksellers don't actually purchase the books that they sell to customers--instead, they act as "agents" for the publishers and take a commission on each sale, which Apple set at 30%. Since the booksellers don't own (take title of) the books, the publishers can set the prices, and the booksellers are obligated to sell the books at that price. Five of the Big 6 publishers implemented agency pricing for their eBooks (Random House waited a year before it implemented agency pricing, which is why it's not under investigation.)
The five participating publishers went to their resellers at approximately the same time, and told them that, regardless of when their existing distribution contracts were to expire, their contracts would be immediately amended to require agency pricing of eBooks. Any reseller who refused would have their supply of eBooks cut off. The first skirmish was between Amazon and Macmillan--Macmillan implemented agency pricing and Amazon briefly stopped sales of all Macmillan titles, but soon relented. That opened the floodgates, and Amazon agreed to agency terms from the four other publishers (although it has refused to accept agency terms from any additional publishers except for Random House).
So far as consumers are concerned, the net result of agency pricing is that prices of eBooks from the Big 6 publishers have gone up substantially, from $9.99 to as much as $16.99. eBooks from the Big 6 were once less expensive than paperbacks; now, in many cases, they're more expensive. In some cases, eBooks are even more expensive than the discounted price of hardcovers.
Both the U.S. Justice Department and the European Union are investigating Apple and the five publishers for price-fixing. The external evidence is that all five publishers implemented the same pricing policies at the same time, and all five threatened to cut off supply to any reseller who refused to agree to the new terms. In Walter Isaacson's biography of Steve Jobs, Jobs is quoted as saying:
"We told the publishers, 'We'll go to the agency model, where you set the price, and we get our 30%, and yes, the customer pays a little more, but that's what you want anyway.'That certainly gives the appearance of an organized effort to raise prices, orchestrated by Apple and executed by the five publishers. Publishers and their defenders argue that agency pricing is necessary to prevent Amazon from getting a monopoly in the eBook market, which, while only 20% or so of the "Big 6" publishers' sales, is likely to become 50% or more in a few years. A monopoly would give Amazon control over pricing. Advocates of the government's position say that the actions of Apple and the five publishers have substantially increased consumer prices for eBooks, and that it's hypocritical for companies like Barnes & Noble to support agency pricing when they used wholesale pricing to wipe out their independent competitors.
Jobs continued, "They went to Amazon and said, 'You're going to sign an agency contract or we're not going to give you the books."
One of the most important things to understand about U.S. antitrust enforcement is that it's illegal to be a monopolist, but it's not illegal to have the potential of becoming a monopolist. At the time that Amazon had a 90% eBook market share, the eBook market was new ("nascent") and both small in units sold and dollar volume. The Justice Department almost never goes after a monopoly in a nascent market. Today, Amazon has between 60% and 65% of the U.S. eBook market--a big share to be sure, but not a monopoly. If agency pricing went away tomorrow and Amazon went back to its old pricing strategy, it's very unlikely that the millions of people who own Nooks and eBooks from Barnes & Noble, Apple and other resellers would throw away their eReaders, tablets and eBook collections and start buying from Amazon. So, Amazon didn't have a monopoly, doesn't have a monopoly now and isn't likely to have one in the future.
On the other hand, price-fixing is illegal, and it doesn't even require a formal agreement among the parties to prove that price-fixing exists. There's no question that agency pricing has raised priced for consumers, at least for titles from the "Big 6". (Statistics rolled out by some defenders of agency pricing that show that eBook prices have dropped also include titles from self-publishing authors, some of whom sell their eBooks for as little as $0.99.)
Publishers argue that Amazon is a very difficult company to do business with, and all the evidence I've seen supports them. However, tough bargainers are a fact of life: Wal-Mart has made the lives of vendors miserable for years while pursuing an "Always the Lowest Price" strategy, but vendors have learned to live with it. Taking illegal action to prevent a company from becoming a monopoly is still illegal.