Barnes & Noble: Controlled landing or slow-motion liquidation?

Barnes & Noble just ended a bad week: First, It announced that it plans to close as many as 200 of its superstores over the next ten years. Then, a few days later, IDC released its global tablet shipments report for Q4 2012, which found that while the worldwide tablet market increased 75% in Q4 2012 year-over-year, shipments of  Barnes & Noble's Nook tablets actually fell 27.7%, from 1.4 million units in Q4 2011 to one million in Q4 2012. Those numbers added to the gloom from the company's quarterly financial report issued in early January, which stated that B&N's sales from bookstores and its eCommerce site in the holiday quarter fell 10.9% year-over-year, while its same-store sales for stores open at least 15 months fell 3.1%. Revenue at Barnes & Noble's Nook Media unit, which includes Nook devices, eBooks and college bookstores, fell 12.6% year-over-year.

The question to some observers isn't what the company will look like once it closes a third of its stores over ten years--it's whether B&N will even be in business ten years from now. The signs aren't good. As an example, take same-store sales, one of the most important financial indicators for retailers, because it only looks at sales growth in stores open a year or more, not new stores. In Barnes & Noble's case, the same-store number for the holiday quarter was -3.1%. However, that -3.1% is an average. Some stores probably had year-over-year increases, but no one outside Barnes & Noble really knows for sure, and that's a critical factor in whether or not the company's plan to close a third of its stores will work. If B&N has a relatively small number of poor-performing stores, the company can close them as quickly as possible and concentrate on the successful stores. However, if sales are falling across most of B&N's locations, a 33% reduction plan won't be nearly enough to stop the bleeding.

Another example is B&N's failed merchandising strategy. Nothing that the company has tried has done anything to improve its stores' performance. It cut back on its music and video departments and used that space to create dedicated display space for its Nook tablets and eReaders, which are usually prominently featured at the front of its stores. However, its Nook business is actually falling faster than its retail business in general, and it's adding to same-store sales declines. It replaced some of its book display space with an increasingly large assortment of toys and games, but that isn't improving same-store sales, either.

Barnes & Noble's situation is looking uncomfortably like that of Borders and Circuit City, both big-box retailers that closed stores and experimented with a variety of merchandising changes, only to find themselves bankrupt and in liquidation. That's where the "controlled landing" vs. "slow-motion liquidation" question comes in. If B&N starts closing stores, and that results in sustainable year-over-year same-store sales gains, the company's plan to slowly weed out poorly performing locations is likely to work. However, if the same-store declines continue, even with fewer stores, B&N will have to dramatically increase its pace of store closings or come up with even more radical merchandising changes that actually work. As much as I want to see Barnes & Noble's retail stores survive, especially now that Borders is gone, my gut tells me that the company is going down the slow-motion liquidation path.