Is Amazon shifting its Core Value Proposition from price to speed?

Two weeks ago, Amazon announced that it intends to build and open its first distribution center in Illinois. Currently, Amazon fulfills many orders to Illinois, including Chicago, from a distribution center in Indiana and others further away. Having a distribution center in Illinois would enable Amazon to provide next-day or even same-day delivery to Chicago customers. However, Amazon also agreed to collect sales tax from Illinois residents as a condition of opening a local distribution center; that effectively represents a 6.25% to 9.75% price increase, depending on the customer, municipality and product category.

Amazon's decision to open a distribution center near Chicago aligns with its recent decisions to open centers near other big cities, including Boston, Charlotte, Los Angeles, Milwaukee and New York Metro (all of which have been announced since September,) and collect sales taxes in those states. In addition, earlier today, Amazon announced an agreement with Hachette to sell its print books and eBooks, after months of public squabbling. The terms of the deal between the two companies are confidential, but both companies have confirmed that Hachette will have the ability to set its own prices for eBooks. That's in line with the agreement that Amazon reached with Simon & Schuster last month, which also gave that publisher the right to set eBook prices.

One other data point, this one anecdotal, is that I recently purchased some food products from Amazon. The company is moving aggressively into grocery sales and delivery with its AmazonFresh service in San Francisco, metro Los Angeles and Seattle. For customers in other areas, Amazon recently launched a service called Amazon Prime Pantry, which enables Amazon Prime members to order a limited selection of non-perishable items for a flat fee of $5.99 with 3-4 business day delivery. That also represents a price increase for Prime customers, who pay nothing for 2-day delivery of other products. I ordered one of the grocery products that didn't require Prime Pantry shipping, but I paid $17.99 for a product that I subsequently purchased for $4.79 from a local supermarket. You can safely assume that much of the price difference went for the "free" shipping.

So, we have multiple points of evidence that Amazon is willing to let its effective consumer prices increase. If that's true, it's a dramatic shift in the company's strategy, which has been to underprice its competition, much like Walmart's now-abandoned "Always the Low Price" strategy. However, if Amazon is willing to no longer be the low-price vendor, what's the tradeoff? Amazon's recent flurry of announcements suggests that it's speed of delivery, and possibly, the ability to provide same-day grocery delivery to the largest metropolitan markets. Amazon is signalling that it intends to offer next-day delivery to perhaps 90% of the continental U.S., and same-day delivery in as many as the 50 largest cities.

I discussed my hypothesis with one of my former clients, and he made a very important point: Anyone can offer the lowest price as long as they're willing to take losses; price is never an effective long-term differentiator. On the other hand, same-day delivery is a powerful differentiator, because it requires massive capital and labor investments that few competitors are willing or able to make. Amazon is making the investments to give it a long-term competitive advantage over not only brick & mortar retailers, but also quasi-competitors like Google that don't have logistics as a core competency. In summary, Amazon is taking some of the money that it's been using to subsidize below-cost sales to consumers and shifting it to capital investments in and labor costs for distribution centers.

Penguin Random House: The Aftermath

Earlier this week, Pearson and Bertelsmann confirmed that they intend to merge Penguin and all of Random House except for its German-language business into a new joint venture, to be named Penguin Random House. (No Random Penguin or Penguin House for us.) Shortly before the deal was announced, word leaked out that News Corp. was considering making an offer to acquire Penguin, but the terms of the Pearson-Bertelsmann deal mean that Pearson can't consider any other offer.

I believe that, three to five years from now, the publishing industry will look much like the recording industry does today, with the Big 6 becoming the Big 3. In fact, it was Bertelsmann's experience in its joint venture with Sony Music that's said by some to be the reason that the company insisted on having a majority interest in its joint venture with Pearson. Its joint venture with Sony was 50:50, and differences in objectives and strategies between the two companies eventually led Bertelsmann to sell its recorded music business to Sony.

If the publishing industry looks like the recording business in a few years, here's a preview of the likely winners and losers:

• Publisher employees: The biggest reason for publisher consolidation is cost reduction. Penguin and Random House, and other consolidating publishers after them, will get rid of redundant distribution facilities and most of the people who work in them. In addition, they'll consolidate cross-imprint functions, such as sales, marketing, copy editing, production and design. That will put a lot of talented professionals on the street, and with fewer big publishers, there will be fewer places for them to look for work.
• Authors: Despite what Penguin and Random House have said, it's inevitable that they, and other consolidating publishers, will reorganize their imprints. Some imprints will be discontinued, and their authors will be moved to other imprints or dropped. The same thing will happen to the editors at the imprints--many will be laid off.
  
  Author acquisition will be dramatically affected. The Big 3 recording companies have all but discontinued their formal A&R (Artists & Repertoire) operations that sent people into the boondocks in order to find new artists. Their equivalents in publishing are acquisitions editors, and many of them will find themselves without jobs. The big publishers will increasingly focus on successful self-publishers as their "farm teams", and will pay big money to poach bestselling authors from each other. For their part, bestselling authors will have less loyalty to publishers, because many of their editors will be gone.
• Retailers: Some industry pundits have speculated that consolidation of the top publishers would give them more clout with retailers such as Amazon and Barnes & Noble. If the recording business is any indicator, they're wrong. Just as with books, the music retailing business consolidated, and highly influential retailers such as Tower Records, Musicland, Wherehouse and Virgin Music are gone (Virgin has closed its U.S. stores but still operates in other countries.) Music retailing in the U.S. is dominated by Apple, and the consolidation of the Big 6 recording companies into the Big 3 has given the surviving record companies little or no additional leverage with Apple or Walmart.
  
  It's unlikely that mergers between the Big 6 publishers will give them any more negotiating power with Amazon, Apple, Barnes & Noble or Kobo. The publishers will continue to depend on the retailers for the vast majority of their revenue, and the U.S. Justice Department will be watching over their shoulders in order to prevent more shenanigans like organized price-fixing.
• Independent Publishers: Independents will actually be helped by publisher consolidation, for several reasons. First, many talented publishing professionals who ordinarily wouldn't have considered working for smaller publishers, or working as freelancers, will become available to independents. Second, some of those professionals will set up their own independent publishing companies. Third, the authors that are shed from the rosters of the consolidating publishers will become available to the independents. Fourth, authors who might have been discovered and developed by the top publishers will instead go to independents. Fifth, with fewer titles coming from the big publishers, retailers will have more shelf space (real or virtual) to devote to independents.
• Self-Publishers: The big publishers will increasingly recruit successful self-publishers to fill their rosters and compensate for the loss of acquisitions editors. The success of the 50 Shades trilogy has eliminated any remaining stigma from self-publishing authors. Big publishers now know that success as a self-publisher is a very strong indicator of marketability--and it eliminates the cost of spending years to develop a promising author.
• Agents: Consolidation of the Big 6 will spell problems for literary agents. They'll have fewer authors on the rosters of the top publishers, and thus, fewer opportunities to earn commissions from big advances and royalty payments. They'll have to devote more of their time to independent publishers, which generally pay lower advances and generate lower royalties for their clients. And, they'll have to compete with other agents to represent successful self-publishers, meaning that they'll have to accept lower commissions.
• Consultants: Publishing consultants who have spent their entire careers in the publishing industry are going to find it hard to adjust to publisher consolidation. Consultants with contracts with two publishers that consolidate into one will have one of their two contracts cancelled, and the surviving contract will be closely scrutinized. (I saw this happen first-hand as the IPTV industry went through massive consolidation starting in 2008.) Publishing consultants will have to shift their focus to independent publishers, which have much smaller budgets than the Big 6.

In short, independent publishers are about the only group that will be a clear winner from publisher consolidation, followed by successful self-publishers. Everyone else will end up either neutral or a loser as a result of consolidation. 

Amazon & Apple: Is their proxy war getting hotter?

Earlier today, according to Reuters, Walmart notified its store managers that the company would no longer carry Amazon's Kindle eReaders and tablets once its existing inventory and committed purchases run out. Walmart confirmed its decision with Reuters, but didn't specify the reason(s). In May, Target announced that it would no longer carry Kindles, and like Walmart, it never made an official public statement about the reason. However, CNN noted that Target had just been authorized by Apple to begin selling iPads, and that it planned to add Apple "mini-stores" within 25 of its locations.

There are two reasons being cited by observers as to why Walmart might have decided to drop Kindles:

1. Amazon may not have offered Walmart a sufficient discount, or
2. Walmart may see Amazon as an increasingly large competitor for general merchandise sales, and doesn't want to support a competitor any longer.

Both of these reasons make sense, and either one of them may be true, but let's sideline that discussion for a bit.

At Publishers Lunch Deluxe, Michael Cader reported on Apple's efforts to get evidence from Amazon for its defense in the government's eBook price-fixing case. According to Cader, Apple has been trying to compel the Justice Department to turn over the transcripts of interviews with 14 Amazon managers and executives. Those interviews weren't taken under oath. The Justice Department argued that the interviews are protected work product, and aren't subject to release. However, Justice has given Apple the names of everyone at Amazon who was interviewed, and said that Apple could take depositions directly from those people. In addition, the Justice Department has released all of its email communications with Amazon and all of the documents and data it received from Amazon during its investigation.

Apparently, Apple took up the Justice Department on its idea, and filed subpoenas to force the 14 Amazon employees to give depositions. Then, last Friday, September 14th, Amazon filed a motion in Seattle Federal court to quash the subpoenas, on the grounds that Amazon isn't a party to the litigation. This week, Apple filed a motion with Judge Denise Cote, who's in charge of all of the U.S. cases related to eBook price-fixing, to move Amazon's motion from Seattle to her court. Judge Cote is now considering Apple's motion.

I don't know that much about the law regarding who can and can't be compelled to provide depositions and discovery documents. What I do know is that if Apple does eventually get the right to enforce its subpoenas, Amazon is going to want to put strict limits in place to prevent any confidential information that's not directly related to the price-fixing case from being revealed to Apple.

That brings me back to the title of this post, and to my first point. Clearly, Apple and Amazon are competing in more areas, and in the U.S., Amazon is currently the only serious competitor to Apple in tablets, based on sales. Apple is widely rumored to be planning to announce a smaller iPad next month. Target dropped Amazon shortly after signing a deal to carry Apple's iPads, and now, a month before the smaller iPad's expected release, Walmart has also dropped Amazon's Kindles. Does that mean that Apple might have made Walmart's getting the small iPad conditional on dropping Amazon? It's certainly possible, but rather than getting into legally murky waters, Apple could have required Walmart to give its products a certain amount and type of display space--a very common condition in retail distribution deals. Walmart would have to get that space from somewhere, and "independently decided" (wink, wink, nudge, nudge) to take it from Amazon. Another perfectly legal option would be if Apple offered Walmart co-op funds if it did certain things (for example, PC manufacturers get reimbursed for part of their advertising costs by Intel if they include that four-note musical theme at the end of their commercials.) These payments amount to a discount--and if Target is already getting them, Walmart would be at a competitive disadvantage if it didn't get them as well.

All of this adds up to "shadows on the wall" suggesting a proxy war between Apple and Amazon:

• Amazon is using the Justice Department as a proxy against Apple to get agency terms and Most Favored Nation clauses terminated, and
• Apple is using Target and Walmart as proxies to hinder Amazon's ability to sell Kindles in stores.

If this "proxy war" model is correct, I'd expect Best Buy to be the next retailer to drop Kindles. Apple has dedicated sales space in most Best Buy stores, and a lot of leverage over the retailer. In addition, Amazon is a strong competitor to Best Buy, so there's plenty of reasons for Best Buy to stop selling Kindles.

You may say that this is all paranoia, and you may be right, but I've spent enough time in high tech to know that everything that's happened so far is right out of the Silicon Valley playbook.